1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. CROIX
2	
3	IN RE:) CASE NO. SX-15-CV-620
4	RED DUST CLAIMS)
5	NED DOSI CHAIMS)
6))ACTION FOR
7) ACTION FOR) CIVIL DAMAGES
8)
9	
10	
11	The hearing in the above-entitled action was heard
12	2:09 p.m.
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	THIS TRANSCRIPT REPRESENTS THE PRODUCT OF AN
19	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, ENGAGED BY THE COURT, WHO HAS PERSONALLY CERTIFIED THAT IT REPRESENTS
20	HER ORIGINAL NOTES AND RECORDS OF TESTIMONY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASE AS RECORDED.
21	
22	
23	
24	KEEMA R. KRIEGER
25	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER SUPERIOR COURT OF THE V.I. (340) 778-9750 Ext. 7154

```
1
 2
                         APPEARANCES:
 3
 4
     For the Plaintiffs:
 5
     LEE J. ROHN & ASSOCIATES
          1101 King Street
 6
          Christiansted, VI 00820
          Phone: 340-778-8855
7
          LEE ROHN, ESQ.
          lee@rohnlaw.com
 8
          RHEA LAWRENCE, ESO.
 9
          rhea@rohnlaw.com
10
11
     For the Defendants:
12
     Law Offices of James L. Hymes III, PC
          33-1 Estate Elizabeth, 7736
13
          P O Box 990
          St. Thomas, VI 00802
14
          ATTORNEY JAMES HYMES, III, ESQ.
          rauna@hymeslawvi.com
15
     Law Office of Carl J. Hartmann III
16
          5000 Estate Coakley Bay, L-6
          Christiansted, VI 00820
17
          ATTORNEY CARL J. HARTMANN, ESQ.
          carl@carlhartmann.com
18
19
     Law Offices of Andrew C. Simpson
          14AB Church St., Ste. 5
20
          Christiansted VI
                           00820
          Phone: 340-719-3900
          Fax: 340-719-3903
21
     BY: ANDREW SIMPSON, ESQ.
22
          asimpson@coralbrief.com
23
     HUNTER & COLE
          The Pentheny Bldq.
24
          1138 King Street, Ste.3
          Christiansted, VI
25
     BY: RICHARD HUNTER, ESQ.
```

```
1
     APPEARANCES CONT.
 2
 3
     Tatro Tekosky Sadwick LLP
 4
          333 S. Grand Ave, Ste. 4270
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
 5
          Tel: (213) 225-7171
          Fax: (213) 225-7151
 6
     BY:
          RENE' P. TATRO, ESQ.
          Email: renetatro@ttsmlaw.com
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(Thereupon, the proceedings commenced at
3	approximately 2:09 p.m.)
4	
5	THE CLERK: IN RE: RED DUST CLAIMS
6	SX-15-CV-620.
7	MS. ROHN: Good Afternoon, Your Honor. Lee
8	Rohn for the plaintiffs in the various cases.
9	THE COURT: Attorney Rohn.
10	MR. HUNTER: Richard Hunter for Glencore
11	Limited with my co-counsel Rene Tatro.
12	THE COURT: Gentlemen.
13	MR. SIMPSON: Good Afternoon, Your Honor.
14	Andrew Simpson on behalf of St. Croix Alumina and ALCOA.
15	THE COURT: Mr. Simpson.
16	MR. HYMES: Good Afternoon, Your Honor. James
17	Hymes for Century Aluminum.
18	THE COURT: Mr. Hymes.
19	MR. HARTMANN: Good Afternoon, Your Honor.
20	Carl Hartmann for SCRG.
21	THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. So this
22	is your second court hearing this week, Attorney
23	Simpson.
24	MR. SIMPSON: Not the least.
25	MS. LAWRENCE: I apologize for my lateness,

Your Honor.

2.

THE COURT: I don't have a fixed agenda so let me just talk and then I'll ask you where you all are and what we need to address. My understanding is we have -- if I can trust SCRG's numbers -- we have 432 complaints encompassing 1,376 plaintiffs. All responsive pleadings have been filed with the expectation -- and those are answers from all defendants except Century, which has filed its motion to dismiss, and Glencore International, which as far as I'm aware, has not been served.

As to Century's motion to dismiss, I just signed the other day the order that permitted the filing in excess of 20 pages, started the clock running on plaintiff's response, which I believe comes to next week.

MS. LAWRENCE: I think the 22nd, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Twenty-second. I also have the other matter that I mentioned, Glencore. As far as I'm aware there's no service of process on Glencore

International and I believe we did touch on that last time around; not sure substantively what we suggested needed to be done but an order will issue on that, that plaintiffs should show cause why Glencore International should not be dismissed for failure to serve.

MR. SIMPSON: Actually, that was your prior

order you gave time to show cause.

2.

THE COURT: I mean, I didn't remember that specifically. I don't see a written order to that effect and I don't read those specific words in the record of proceedings, so I'll be more precise going forward.

I have from the defendants a proposed discovery order with a suggestion that plaintiffs are somewhat in agreement, at least to the questionnaire, but I don't have any affirmative response from the --

MS. ROHN: Yes, you do. I called your chambers and I spoke to Ms. Brady and she told me to email it to Iris Cintron, because I was afraid it would get downstairs and not upstairs. And we did that about 10:30 this morning.

THE COURT: Ms. Cintron tells me that she didn't --

LEE ROHN: It would have come from Kareema Jenkins. I have a copy of the email that went.

THE COURT: Well anyway, I haven't seen it and I'm not going to try to digest it right now, but why don't you give me your nutshell perspective in what ways it varies from what the defendant have presented.

MS. ROHN: Yes, Your Honor. The first issue that seems to have to be addressed at this court, with

this Court is what is the standard in the Virgin Islands for causation of a -- substance in previous decisions in this matter have been found to be a dangerous nuisance.

And the defendants' position is that we have to have general causation, specific causation, quantity that were released, and we don't believe that's the law in the Virgin Islands. As a result of various Virgin Islands Supreme Court cases that have held that a temporal relationship between the incident and the injuries, incident to the incident, which are the type of injuries that one would expect from the incident, that a temporal relationship is sufficient for causation in the Virgin Islands.

THE COURT: What does all that have to do with the discovery plan?

MS. ROHN: Because the defendant in their discovery plan sets out that all this is required; and therefore, before we are going to have to have experts on each of these issues, and otherwise we don't have a case.

THE COURT: I did see a comment about experts not being necessary. Is it plaintiff's position that simply proximity and time and place --

MS. ROHN: A temporal relationship.

THE COURT: -- obviates the need for any

2.

expert testimony to tie it in?

1

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

It is the plaintiff's position that MS. ROHN: the Defendant ALCOA and the related entities issued MSDS sheets for this product that said it was dangerous, that it contained the following dangerous chemicals, that these are the symptoms that you will get if you're exposed to it. And that it is not in dispute that it was during the hurricane large amounts of it was dispersed over the neighborhoods of people who we represent, and that thereafter in attempts to rectify the situation it was then several times, multiple times over the last 30 years, reintroduced to these neighborhoods. Every time they took the crust off the top of it then it would blow back into the neighborhoods, and then on each of those events the symptoms that it was said to likely cause were the exact symptoms that the plaintiffs got temporally. Immediately thereafter when the substance dissipated they stop those events. And -- but there are several cases in the Supreme Court that has issues that state that there's not a need for expert opinion if it's a type of symptom you would expect, and it was temporally -- there's a temporal relationship between the two.

THE COURT: But in terms -- all of the ground

work you've just laid with or without expert testimony that is going to require extensive discovery.

2.

MS. ROHN: Correct. But I'm only addressing that their memorandum starts by saying, of course we can't prove our case because we need all these experts, and if we don't have them then the case should be dismissed.

THE COURT: All right. That's a few years down the line.

MS. ROHN: Well, we believe this is a central issue to this case, so we're preparing a motion for declaratory judgment as to what is the standard proof for causation in this type of instance.

THE COURT: Is there such a thing as a motion for declaratory judgment?

MS. ROHN: You can have what the law of the case is declared, yes. So -- and we believe that ultimately to save everybody time and energy and money that's an issue that should ultimately be certified to the Supreme Court given how many cases there are. And why go through a trial of four hundred and something lawsuits or however many and have it go to the Supreme Court and say: Oh no, that's the wrong standard of proof.

THE COURT: What is the relationship, if any,

between these issues and the cases that were dismissed on summary judgment in the District Court?

MS. ROHN: The cases that were dismissed on summary judgment in the District Court applied law prior to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, and the Virgin Islands Supreme Court's Banks analysis and before the Virgin Islands Supreme Court adopting certain causation decisions that are contrary to the decisions that were relied on by Judge Barton from Pittsburgh. And we don't believe -- and we know that while the District Court's decision is to be considered, it is not precedential on the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Nor with the Third Circuit.

MS. ROHN: So, it would seem given that we know our Supreme Court, on the Banks analysis, looks at what's best for the Virgin Islands and doesn't necessarily follow the restatement or anything else that -- other than the precedence in the Virgin Islands and our Virgin Islands view of the law, that we are to get a decision from the Supreme Court on what is on the Banks analysis the best law for the Virgin Islands.

THE COURT: Okay. And all of that impacts the method by which and extent to which discovery is engaged.

MS. ROHN: I don't contend that the

2.

questionnaires can't be answered at the same time that is winding its way up. Because even if we were to lose that issue we would still have the issue of the property damage to each of the plaintiffs and the mental anguish from their property damage. So even if we lost that issue we wouldn't lose the whole case. So I think questionnaires should go forth. There are -- there's no way we can get these questionnaires in 120 days.

MS. LAWRENCE: Two hundred and forty.

2.

MS. ROHN: We ask for 240, and the reason is many of my plaintiffs don't -- not only don't speak English but they don't read or write. And since the hurricane many of them have located to the states. So this is going to be a time consuming burden to try and get done, and it can't get done in 120 days. And it'll be difficult to get done in 240 days, but we certainly could make a good faith effort to do that.

The other thing that the defendant recommended is that if we didn't have a questionnaire by 120 days then my clients will automatically be dismissed, and of course that's not allowed in the Virgin Islands. There could be motions to dismiss, but there's a lot of factors that would have to be waived before a decision on whether or not to dismiss a plaintiff in this jurisdiction other than they didn't answer the

questionnaire on time. So that's another dispute that we have with them.

2.

And then of course we have no difficulty with picking, having a random pick of plaintiffs. We think that the number 150 is too high to then say we're going to now seriatim try 150 cases because the real purpose of trying the first set of cases is to get sort of a bellwether of where the values of the cases are and then take another look at settling. And you don't need 150 trials in order to do that, so we think that they ought to be done in groups of 20. You know, the Court can randomly pick 20. We can randomly try 20, take another look at the cases, but 150 is too much.

THE COURT: All right. I guess in terms of
Mass Court Litigation and bellwether trials these
plaintiffs are not so dissimilarly situated to each
other that they wouldn't be representative of the group
at large. In other words, I don't know if they're all
in Clifton Hill, Machuchal, Harvey area or Profit. And
to the extent they're in different areas, how different
are they. Some of them are alleging property damages,
some are alleging personal injury. So can we come up
with representative issues?

MS. ROHN: I'm not so much suggesting representative plaintiffs as the manner in which trial

claims. But in reality -- so I'm not saying if A, who's representative of 50 of the plaintiffs, gets this much money then all 50 of the plaintiffs get that much money. I'm not suggesting that. I am suggesting that if you took randomly 20 plaintiffs, and if you were a defendant trying to protect your client and you saw that the range of verdicts were between this number and this number, depending upon the different variabilities, and you lost all 20 cases and you have damages for all of them, then you would probably go back to your client and say: Well, you need to stop paying me and let's see if we can't get these cases settled.

Conversely, if the plaintiffs saw that the jury for some reason didn't want to give damages to plaintiffs deny the claims, certain claims, that would change our settlement posture of what we're looking at to try to settle. So I'm only saying try 20, take a break to look at settlement. If that's successful try 20 more, but I think that having to try 150 cases in a row is way too much. And it also may be that when we get these questionnaires filled out that we will be able to designate different type of claims of plaintiffs that are all similar as to exposure, as to how many times they were exposed, how many times they got hit with the red dust.

We also have some that had claims for their homes being damaged as a result of trying to water blast their homes to get the red dust out and frying all their appliances. So there may be when the questionnaires are through, an ability to say we can randomly pick from these different types of plaintiffs so that you get a better spectrum, than just randomly picking and getting everybody that only have property damage claims.

And the final issue in this case, Your Honor, is that this Court has ruled that each of these cases are dissimilar, can't be brought together and have to be tried individually. There's been no appeal of that.

The pro hac vice admissions in this case were through the case of Abednego at which is soon to be dismissed because he's dead and we have no survivor. And to the extent that this Court has taken the position that each of these cases are different we had to file a separate complaint for each of these cases and had to pay a separate filing fee for each of these cases.

And given the Supreme Court is the actual part of the court that has to decide whether or not someone can appear pro hac vice in a number of cases that never moved to be in pro hac vice, it appears to me that the defendant, to the extent the off-island defense attorneys want to appear in these cases they're going to

have to petition the Supreme Court to either request that the Supreme Court allow them to appear in all these individual cases without a new pro hac vice request, or the Supreme Court is going to have to say, just like plaintiff had to pay a filing fee for each of these cases, you're going to have to apply and pay a pro hac vice fee for each of these cases. So we object to the stateside counsel participating in these cases because we think it's in violation of pro hac vice statute in the Virgin Islands, which provides if the cases are found to be dissimilar you cannot appear in another case just because you've been allowed in one case. And so that is a fundamental issue in this case as well.

MS. LAWRENCE: Just one clarification, Your Honor. The Supreme Court very well might permit the defendants to participate, but I believe this is an issue not for the Court or the parties to just resolve on our own. I believe there should be a petition to the Supreme Court, Your Honor, to resolve this issue.

THE COURT: All right. Of course this comes up in context of my question about the plaintiff's response to the discovery plan. So, would you defense counsel like to take your turn and respond to what you just heard?

MS. ROHN: Well, that would note that this is

2.

a defense counsel who may -- who may be practicing --1 2. unauthorize practice of law since he's not admitted in this case. 3 4 MR. SIMPSON: Do you want me to address that 5 pro hac vice issue or anything else? Well, let Mr. Tatro, right? 6 THE COURT: 7 MR. TATRO: Tatro. THE COURT: Tatro. In what case are you 8 admitted? 9 MR. TATRO: Abednego for sure. And we do that 10 11 as one matter with all the cases. THE COURT: These are consolidated under 12 13 Abednego so --14 MS. ROHN: Abednego is going to be 15 dismissed. 16 THE COURT: His individual case. Anyway, I'm 17 not addressing that, but I'm sure thrown into the mix 18 certainly the defense should have a chance to respond. 19 My focus was primarily on the discovery issues. 20 Mr. Tatro, have you seen the plaintiff's written 21 response? MR. TATRO: I have, Your Honor. It's short 22 23 and the points that are raised are the ones Ms. Rohn 24 addressed to the Court. And I got it this morning about 25 10:30 and I tried to think about it and discussed it

with the other defendants and prepared to respond to her points. And hopefully we can move forward.

2.

THE COURT: I'll let -- be glad to hear from all of the defense counsel, but what I'm going to do is allow both sides to meet and confer further and try to come up with a plan that works for both. Like I said, I haven't seen what the plaintiffs have to say. I've seen the representation of the defendants. The plaintiffs are pretty much on board, so I'll give you an opportunity to get on board completely. And to the extent you can't then you would show me where the differences are.

Go ahead with whatever you'd like to say.

MR. TATRO: Thank you, Your Honor. My starting premises is that we're going to be back in six months. The Court indicated that you're going to have us down every six months or so.

THE COURT: I'll just go ahead and set that right now, July 26, 2018, at 10 o'clock in the morning. That is a Thursday.

MR. TATRO: May I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. TATRO: Thank you.

With that as the starting premises and taking plaintiff's discussion about 240 days versus ours of 120

days, my suggestion is that what we do is we take 180 days because we'll all be back together in six months.

And I understand Ms. Rohn's and Ms. Lawrence's concern with the people that are off island or who don't read or write English. That obviously isn't everybody.

2.

So my suggestion is that we set 180 days as the response date and in 180 days if there is a group of people who are not going to be able to respond within that timeframe the plaintiffs can notify us. We'll meet and confer on an extension for those people who are identified by name; and if we can't agree then when we're here in 180 days in July we'll bring that up with the Court: Say, here's a group of people who hasn't responded. And at that point our request is going to be would there be an order to show cause by the plaintiffs as to why those people should not be dismissed.

Then I understand procedurally the way it would normally be is that the defendants would make a motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs would respond, but we're starting out with the discovery order that says, "respond to this questionnaire". The failure to do that -- all this suggestion does is cut out a step, so that if the plaintiff doesn't respond and we haven't agreed to an extension of time, and we're not going to be unreasonable about that, but if we haven't agreed then

they can show cause as to why the plaintiffs should not be dismissed. So that's really the only place where I think we're in disagreement there.

Her suggestion, with respect to --

2.

THE COURT: If there was more standard discovery you'd be looking initially at a motion to compel and then a motion for some type of sanction, and it would be pretty far down the road that you got to a dismissal and Attorney Rohn suggested it'll probably be a Rule 41 dismissal for failure to prosecute as oppose to: Oh, you didn't respond to questionnaire, so goodbye. I think that would be a little tough to sell on appeal.

MR. TATRO: And we are whetted to anything like that procedurally. All we're trying to do is what I think the Court has urged us to do is move this case forward, and so trying to cut out a step or two along the way was really the basis for what we were suggesting. Ms. Rohn's discussion about the standard of causation, getting the Virgin Islands Supreme Court to weigh in on that, I think while we're going forward with what we're doing in terms of questionnaires and next steps, and I'll get to the next step questions in a moment, but she can make whatever motions that she wants and try and get something to the Virgin Islands Supreme

Court but I don't think that should put our case on hold here. I think we should continue to move forward and do things.

2.

THE COURT: As I think, that's what Attorney Rohn said.

MR. TATRO: I think she agrees with that, yes. Although what I'm working with is what they've put in front of us this morning and her comments now, but I do think that she's in agreement. The question really is how is she going to get something to the Supreme Court and what is it going to be that is not an advisory opinion, because a motion on something like this really needs the context of what is happening in a particular case.

THE COURT: Not to cut you off --

MR. TATRO: Sure.

THE COURT: I believe there is a Supreme Court case, in essence, says there's a statute by which, I guess, the Superior Court in the first instance and then the Supreme Court can give advisory opinions where there is a referral from counsel; but I'm not -- other than counsel having a vague awareness of that opinion, that statute, I don't know the details. But you know, I'm all for moving this as expeditiously as possible, which generally speaking would suggest that we not get

involved in interlocutory appeals, but that's a pretty basic -- anyway, that's still down the road.

1

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. TATRO: It is. And the reason I was addressing it now, how we T it up, how it gets T'd up could have an influence on the next steps because Ms. Rohn, Attorney Rohn talks about how each of the symptoms, each of the symptoms that all of the plaintiffs experienced are the exact symptoms. Honor, I don't have discovery on these people, but based on the *Henry* work that we did that's just not so. we're not talking about a situation where somebody puts their thumb on the table and they hit it with a hammer and you would say, Oh. That happened right after. You've got a painful thumb right after you hit it with a It's a very different situation. Here there's hammer. numerous alternative causes. There's a vast array of different symptomology, different timing that the plaintiffs that we took discovery of experienced, so when I say --

THE COURT: As I hear Attorney Rohn, my understanding is that standard is different from District Court, Third Circuit than the law as it is developing under the Supreme Court, and that proximity in time and space and symptomology is sufficient absent expert testimony. Your presentation to the District

Court and the Third Circuit was dependent upon expert evidence, was it not?

2.

MR. TATRO: We certainly used expert evidence, but the point I was trying to make now is not so dependent on expert evidence as it is over the difference between this case -- the situation I was talking about with the thumb on the table and the hammer. Then I can understand the standard that Attorney Rohn was talking about because there's not alternative causes. We're not talking about 30 years of different things happening in their lives, their smoking history, the coxsackie virus outbreak, we're not talking about any of that.

And in addition, the idea that you can just have exposure, well, why when I'm thumbed with a hammer and my thumb turns blue I know that I've had exposure to a hammer hitting myself on my thumb; but here there's no evidence of the level of exposure that these people had and whether or not that was sufficient so I think that we're talking about something different. And I'm not quivelling with the Virgin Islands standard, I'm just saying in the context of this case how are we actually going to apply it. So if she wants to take something up while we're proceeding with discovery and T it up in a way that's going to advance the ball for us all, we'll

respond if it's necessary to respond. We'll do what's necessary, but at this point I think we should focus on how do we go forward with discovery. And if Attorney Rohn initiates some procedure that takes us to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court maybe the issues that I'm raising now will be pertinent, maybe they won't.

2.

THE COURT: Are you familiar with any vehicle?

Attorney Rohn talked about a motion for declaratory

judgment. I mean, I know an action for declaratory

judgment, but I've never heard of a motion for

declaratory judgment.

MR. TATRO: Your Honor, I'm puzzled too to the extent in the last few hours in talking with our co-defense counsel. I tried to puzzle through that, and I don't know of anything per se like that. I think that there may be. You know, I could hypothesize procedural devices which might take her there. If she had a motion for summary judgment that you either granted or denied one of us would then petition to have the question go up, but without a discussion about the facts in a particular case I'm not sure how we can even get to a motion for summary judgment.

THE COURT: Well, it's just speculation at this point, but maybe it does have to look at a particular plaintiff or group of plaintiffs and

particular evidence and rulings relating to whether or not expert medical exams or expert testimony is necessary. Maybe there are those discovery steps that the basic difference of opinion would give rise to the vehicle. Anyway, interesting to hear it out.

2.

MR. TATRO: Yes, and it would, Your Honor, and that's -- I've given you the benefit of the couple hours that I've had with co-defense counsel to digest it.

The other part that I wanted to address was our discovery plan goes past the initial responses to the questionnaires and puts in place a program for what happens next. And what Attorney Rohn was saying this morning -- this afternoon is not in her paper and so I didn't know that she was going to suggest 20 or anything other than the 150. But I do think that the 150 is a good number because I don't -- Henry proved that they can't proceed on a representative basis. There are differences among them and --

THE COURT: One hundred fifty is certainly larger than a bellwether group --

MR. TATRO: Your Honor, and this came through our paper and was poorly presented because we're not suggesting that we try 150 cases, but we are suggesting that we work up through the steps that we had and they were pretty limited steps. We wanted to get medical

records, take if necessary the depositions of the treating physicians; if necessary, a one-hour deposition of each plaintiff, which is not an onerous thing. I've done many -- in cases done 150 or more of those kinds of depositions, one-hour depositions. And then the Court will be in a position and we will be in a position because I think that's what everybody, that's what the Court wants to get to, is to talk about what happens next. We were not suggesting that we pick 150. We go through these interim steps of pulling their medical records and assessing their medical records and taking one-hour depositions and then go to trial on them.

What we said was let's do this: Let's get a pool of 150, work through this, a pretty focused process, and then we'll meet with Court. We meet and confer with plaintiffs; make, I thought, good steps forward and meeting and conferring on the questionnaire and see if we can come up with next steps. But I don't think the 150 -- and I really apologize if it was presented as this is what we want to try, because I don't envision a trial of 150 people at one time.

THE COURT: Does that mean you jettison the first suggestion of taking discovery on all 1376 plaintiffs?

MR. TATRO: Your Honor, I am not jettisoning

2.

that, and if that's the Court's order I think that is a way that we could and should proceed. And that's how we presented it and had been presenting it for last six or eight months. We're at peace doing that; but I took away from our last discussion in August that the Court wanted us to think hard about something other than that, so we did think hard about it. But if the Court's inclined to let us do that we're fully prepared to do that.

THE COURT: Thank you.

2.

MR. TATRO: Mr. Hunter is prepared to discuss that pro hac vice issue if the Court will like.

THE COURT: Sure. How about on discovery, is there anything else?

MS. ROHN: I think one of the things that I raised that I might not have told him is that there were 50 or 60 depositions taken in the underlying interim days of the ALCOA employees, the refinery employees, the people who went out in the neighborhoods, what they did. I haven't heard an opposition to it that those depositions would not have to be retaken as to all the defendants that participated in those depositions.

MR. TATRO: May I address that briefly, Your
Honor? We have SCRG and Century here today and they can
speak for themselves. They did not participate in those

and ALCOA and Glencore did participate in some of 1 2. those. Excuse me. Just stop right there. 3 THE COURT: 4 Century guys has a dispositive motion so --5 MS. ROHN: Century has a dispositive motion 6 and those depositions are not applicable to -- they are not applicable to Renaissance. 7 THE COURT: Renaissance wasn't even --8 9 MS. ROHN: No, I understand Renaissance didn't 10 participate but they are not applicable. 11 THE COURT: All right. Sorry to cut you off. 12 13 MR. TATRO: That's okay. 14 So then I'm not sure what they're asking for. 15 what they're asking for --16 THE COURT: Is it appropriate to utilize 17 depositions that have already been taken? 18 MR. TATRO: I guess. I would say as to 19 Glencore, the deposition that were taken of Glencore 20 individuals, I think Ms. Rohn could try and use those 21 against Glencore. I'm not requiring that she depose 22 Glencore, but I don't know that I should be bound for an 23 ALCOA deposition that was taken, or I or my client 24 should be bound upon that. So if she wants to take the 25 risk, I guess that a deposition that she wants to use

against Glencore that she took of ALCOA is usable here, 1 2. I think that's up to her. If she want to retake those that's also up to her. I'm not gonna say one way or the 3 other, and I think ALCOA probably is in the same 4 5 position vis-a-vis, Glencore. MS. ROHN: Your Honor, in those depositions 6 ALCOA and Glencore participated in all depositions. 7 They asked questions and did cross-examinations. 8 9 THE COURT: And of course -- is it proper to say that was in the same case or --10 11 MS. ROHN: It's the same dispute and the same 12 parties. You can use -- there's already a Supreme Court 13 decision that says that if the parties are the same you 14 can use depositions between the parties that they both 15 participated in, in another matter. 16 This may be not even another THE COURT: 17 This is Josephat Henry, right, the original matter. class action --18 19 MS. ROHN: Correct. 20 THE COURT: -- deemed not a class action anymore and here we are today. 21 MS. ROHN: Correct. So when most of the 22 23 depositions were taken they were taken as part of the 24 class action because the class was certified, went up to 25 the Third Circuit, was certified. So all these

depositions were taken on behalf of all the people who 1 were in the class. 2. That's good that all of that was 3 THE COURT: 4 preserved rather than 20 years later people have to try 5 to take it again. 6 Your Honor, the only thing I would say to that is the first time I heard about this, 7 maybe it was raised last August. I don't remember if it 8 9 was or not, but the first I heard of it before we filed 10 for this hearing was when we got their paperwork this 11 morning, and I really haven't thrashed that through with 12 the other defendants. So maybe that's something we 13 should do instead of me just up here shooting from the 14 hip. 15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thanks. 16 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. TATRO: 17 MR. HARTMANN: Before you move on to the pro 18 hac vice which doesn't involve SCRG, can I just get two 19 clarifications? 20 Yes, Sir. THE COURT: 21 Thank you. Carl Hartmann for MR. HARTMANN: 22 St. Croix Renaissance Group. 23 First of all, I'd just like to find out what 24 Attorney Rohn means when she said to take the 200 --25 we're not adverse to changing the times at all, the

number of days in the questionnaire, but would that be 1 2. a rolling production? I suppose Attorney Lawrence and I are probably more interested in this from a practical 3 4 standpoint than anybody else, but would this be -- we 5 aren't going to get all of them on day 240 --We would not do that. As we get 6 MS. ROHN: 7 the questionnaires and as they are signed we're going to produce it. 8 9 MR. HARTMANN: Because then we're going to need time to do it and --10 11 MS. ROHN: No, we wouldn't do that. 12 MR. HARTMANN: Okay. The second thing I'd 13 like to bring up, and it goes to the discovery plan, is 14 that SCRG has an uncontested motion with regard to 15 consolidation --16 THE COURT: We'll get to that in a minute. 17 MR. HARTMANN: Oh, okay. Thank you, Your 18 Honor. 19 THE COURT: Anybody else on the defense side 20 regarding discoveries? 21 MR. SIMPSON: No, Your Honor. Mr. Tatro covered it. 22 23 THE COURT: All right. Rather than require me 24 to sort it out, I am going to require you all to sort it 25 We've all got a pass on account of the weather

events over the last months in terms of our timing, so arguably these things should have been resolved before today. But let me give you time to go back and work these things out between yourselves, and I'd like to do it -- I'd like to ask you to report back in 15 days, which would be February 2nd. Would that give both sides enough time?

MR. SIMPSON: Your Honor, it seems to me with respect to the questionnaires, the first thing that we need to agree upon, because we're very close, we probably could do this in 15 minutes --

MS. ROHN: No, I don't think that's quite true. We're at a difference between 150 people and 20 people. I think February 2nd would be just fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So let me ask you to -- or require that you meet and confer and submit something jointly in terms of a discovery plan by February 2, which is two weeks from tomorrow. And to the extent that you have differences then each side can setforth those differences, and we'll take it from there.

On discovery, anything else we should address right now?

MS. ROHN: Not for the plaintiff.

MR. TATRO: Your Honor, if I could, and maybe I've lost the thread here, but I think that we are in agreement that the questionnaires should go out --

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to give you 15
days to see. I don't want to do a piecemeal. See what
you come up with. At worst, we're delaying the
distribution to the plaintiffs to 15 days. I thought I
read in the defendants' presentation that there was one
or two tweaks that were necessary or perhaps --

MS. ROHN: They've been done.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROHN: I've got a tweak -- sorry, Your Honor. I've got a tweak one I think like three or four days ago.

THE COURT: I mean, nothing is stopping you from delivering them and having them. I mean, If you report to me on February 2 that we've agreed on the questionnaires, and there have been 1,376 questionnaires have been delivered to the plaintiffs, then great, but I'm not going to order that you do that today. Let me just hear what you come up with collectively by February 2 and we'll take it from there; but I will, once -- immediately thereafter, to the extent that there is no disagreement about the questionnaire as being a way to garner discoverable information, and yes, promptly that

should occur. That should be incorporated into whatever 1 2. you present to me. And your goal is that we have a 3 MR. TATRO: 4 joint discovery order that we present to you on the 2nd. 5 And if not, we'll put it in complete orders, I guess? 6 MS. ROHN: No. Usually what we do is we put here's what we agreed to on this issue, and this is the 7 defense's position and why; and this is the plaintiff's 8 9 position and why. It's one document submitted by both 10 parties and then the Court has it all together in one 11 place. 12 THE COURT: Present it in a way that is 13 easiest to understand to the extent that -- put it all 14 on one document, great, but I don't care if it's one 15 document, two thousand documents. 16 MR. TATRO: Very well, now I understand. 17 Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Thank you. I guess the only other 19 thing I have is that motion to consolidate which was 20 filed on August 31, the Eleanor Abraham cases that 21 has --22 MS. ROHN: We don't oppose that, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: The Eleanor Abraham cases are only 24 against SCRG, however, in that motion there's a 25 suggestion that most of those Eleanor Abraham plaintiffs are already -- already have complaints filed. That there are, I believe, nine. Why don't you speak to that, Mr. Hartmann.

1

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Thank you, Your Honor. MR. HARTMANN: The official numbers now are that out of the plaintiffs there are 255 that were just on Eleanor Abraham; 284 that are in Red Dust and Eleanor Abraham; and 1,088 that are just in Red Dust. That's kind of where we are based on all the documents being in now, the complaints and So the Eleanor Abraham case was simply-the answers. how do I put this -- the people that were kind of left out of the earlier case for procedural reasons got kind of picked up in a separate case. So it's all the same claims, all the same theories, a lot of same -- as I said, a lot of the same people.

THE COURT: But only one-party defendant, and except that the same plaintiffs have sued the other defendants in the original case.

MS. ROHN: Only 284.

THE COURT: Two hundred and eighty four?

MS. ROHN: Yes, 284.

MR. HARTMANN: It would be us that would be objecting to that normally, Your Honor, and SCRG isn't.

I mean, the one issue where it gets a little complexed Attorney Rohn has already addressed. She said she

doesn't intend to use the prior material in terms of depositions and admissions and things like that against -- to seek damages against SCRG, so as long as that's the case we have no concern about the next cases.

2.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll -- and I want to make sure how is that 288 plaintiffs --

MS. ROHN: Two hundred eight four.

THE COURT: Two hundred and eighty four plaintiffs --

MS. ROHN: I can explain that, Your Honor. So those 284 had a claim against ALCOA, but didn't originally have a claim against SCRG. But they do have a claim against SCRG because they lived in the area during the events that are impacted by the dust.

THE COURT: So that the complaint alleged different causes of action?

Ms. ROHN: It alleges different -- it alleges different events, different nuisances, in other words, dangerous nuisances from ALCOA, Glencore. And then nuisances -- SCRG is when they purchased the property, they went in and redid the -- the red dust, and that caused red dust in certain of -- and those two are going to be where red dust go back into their homes and they were re-exposed. And then there was some other events where that happened again. So some of those people were

also impacted by Glencore and ALCOA.

2.

And then there's the other group that were not impacted by Glencore, ALCOA, or did not bring suit against Glencore, ALCOA and are only complaining about the circulation of the red dust by SCRG.

MR. HARTMANN: Another way to think of it, Your Honor, is this, that in all the other cases which alleged that there was injury in the original release and that there has been releases since then and that's been complicated, we're just the people who bought the place in 2001/2 time periods. So whatever the continuing injuries and the continuing relief that's being requested in those cases is essentially being requested against us.

MS. ROHN: I might make this simpler because none of our plaintiffs are claiming lifetime injuries. They're claiming acute injuries as a result of acute events that lasted somewhere between one or two months, maybe three months. They recovered. We're not claiming cancer, we're not claiming -- these are acute injuries from a dangerous nuisance and then so -- so we're not saying, oh, when we got hit with the original thing we -- we're sick to this day. We do not find any plaintiffs that we believe a valid claim could be made that they are sick to this day. We don't have any

future medical monitoring.

I think that the *Henry* case was a different case in that regard. There was some belief that there was chromium zits and all that stuff. We're not bringing those cases. We're bringing an event of discharging nuisance into their homes and their cisterns; the ensuing result of that, the damage to their property and their bodies for the time periods that was; and then to the extent that there was then another discharge seven months, eight months later and they had the same problems, and they had that for a period of time, they were claiming damages for that.

THE COURT: And all that predates SCRG's existence.

MS. ROHN: Correct. But because they are not permanent in nature you can't say: Oh, well, how do you know that's not ALCOA? Because we're not claiming that the problems they have are permanent in nature. We're claiming that they are acute problems. His would be his acute problems, theirs would be their acute problems.

MR. HARTMANN: If I may, Your Honor. Another way to look at it is, if we don't do this, if we don't consolidate it, you're going to end up trying the same case by the same plaintiff twice.

THE COURT: Or maybe somebody else would be

2.

trying it.

2.

MR. HARTMANN: I may well not, but I think you will. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else?

Here is what I have -- by the way, defense objected to certain items that were in the case management order a few months ago and I have not yet responded to that. So we'll go ahead and take care of that.

As discussed, Century's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs response according to Attorney Lawrence is due January 22, and then any reply in due course. The discovery order we talked about. The parties jointly will present what can be agreed upon, and what can't be agreed upon by 15 days from now which is February 2.

We have the next status conference for scheduled 10 a.m., July 26, 2018. The order is going to issue requiring plaintiffs to show cause why Glencore International should not be dismissed for failure of service of process, and I will issue an order regarding the SCRG motion to consolidate with which plaintiffs concur.

MS. LAWRENCE: Your Honor, one point, I'm sorry. For the motion to dismiss, can we agree to a 20-day extension for the plaintiffs to respond to that motion if the defense don't object?

1	THE COURT: Can you and I agree?
2	MS. LAWRENCE: Can we all agree. May I have
3	an extension please? We have supplemental briefing in
4	the en banc that was issued yesterday and I'm having to
5	refocus on that.
6	THE COURT: Attorney Hymes.
7	MR. HYMES: Your Honor, I have no objection to
8	that.
9	MS. LAWRENCE: That would be great. Thank
10	you.
11	THE COURT: Remember in the case management
12	order you all got your three freebies?
13	MS. LAWRENCE: Three free extensions? Thank
14	you, I need this one.
15	MS. ROHN: Three may not be enough, Your
16	Honor. Thank you.
17	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you all very much.
18	(Thereupon, at approximately 2:53 p.m., the
19	proceedings were concluded.)
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I, KEEMA R. KRIEGER, Official Court Reporter, of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Croix, do hereby certify that I reported by machine shorthand, in my official capacity, the hearing IN RE: RED DUST CLAIMS, SX-15-CV-620, in said Court, on the 18th day of January, 2018. I FURTHER CERTIFY that the foregoing pages are a true and accurate computer-aided transcription of my stenotype notes of said proceedings. I HAVE HEREUNTO subscribed my name, this 2nd day of February 2018. /S/Keema Krieger KEEMA R. KRIEGER, Official Court Reporter